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Understanding Long-Run African Growth: 
Colonial Institutions or Colonial Education? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Long-term gr wth in developing countries has been explained in four frameworks: 
‘extractive colonial institutions’ (Acemoglu et al., 2001), ‘colonial legal origin’ (La 
Porta et al., 2004) ‘geography’ (Gallup et al., 1998) and ‘colonial human capital’ 
(Glaeser et al., 2004). In this paper we test the ‘colonial human capital’ explanation for 
sub-Saharan Africa, controlling for legal origins and geography. Utilizing data on 
colonial-era education, we find that instrumented human capital explains long-term 
growth better, and shows greater stability over time, than instrumented measures for 
extractive institutions. We suggest that the impact of the disease environment on African 
long-term growth runs through a human capital channel rather than an extractive-
institutions channel. The effect of education is robust to including variables capturing 
legal origin and geography, which have additional explanatory power. 
JEL codes: O11, P16, P51 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper is an empirical examination of the colonial origins of Africa’s economic 
growth. Developments in growth theory suggest that explanations should be located in 
the broad areas of geography, institutions and human capital. Whereas the geography 
school examines factors where one-way causality with growth is beyond reasonable 
doubt, - including location, precipitation, sunshine and natural endowments - empirical 
studies on institutions need to address an endogeneity problem. Recent studies have done 
so by employing variables that precede modern economic growth in the developing 
world, including the legal systems used by colonising powers (La Porta et al., 2004) and 
settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
This paper extends this approach to the study of human capital’s impact on long-
run growth in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter ‘Africa’). We focus on Africa because of the 
availability of colonial data relating to our research topic. Also, Africa’s experience 
occupies a sufficiently distinct place in the development literature to merit separate study 
of the continent (as testified to by the notorious ‘Africa dummy’ appearing in much 
cross-country econometric work). We utilise freshly collected data on African colonial 
human capital and instrument it with settler mortality. Our main positive finding is that 
instrumented colonial-era education is a causal factor for long-term growth. This finding 
is robust to inclusion of additional effects of legal origin and geography. Our education 
measure explains growth better and shows greater stability over time than do measures 
for extractive institutions used by Acemoglu et al. (2001). We also find some evidence 
that institutions are endogenous to education, as suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004). 
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 3 
 The next section reviews the four main schools of thought in the current debate on 
the roots of long-term growth, followed by a historical background on colonial education 
in section 3. Section 4 introduces our data and presents the analysis and results. Section 5 
concludes with a summary and discussion of our findings. 
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2. Explanations of Long-Term Growth 
 
2.1. Extractive Institutions 
Institutions are broadly defined as the written and informal rules, beliefs, norms and 
habits that ’constrain and liberate human action’ (North, 1990). Any empirical study on 
institutions and growth must come to terms with the pervasive and often elusive nature of 
institutions – particularly, their manifold manifestations, and the endogeneity of 
institutions to growth. A milestone study is by Acemoglu et al. (2001) who address both 
problems by studying a large number of former European colonies and defining their 
colonial-era institutions generically as ‘extractive’ or ‘constructive’. The authors suggest 
that where the disease environment was favourable to European settlers, they settled in 
larger numbers and built societies with economic institutions akin to those in Europe. 
These would typically include many checks and balances on state power, fostering 
private entrepreneurship, trade and innovation. In contrast, where the disease 
environment was not favourable - as indicated by high settler mortality - Europeans 
created ‘extractive institutions’: legal constructs endowing the state with large powers 
and few constraints, designed to effectively transfer natural resources to the colonisers 
while stifling private initiative and commercial development (Acemoglu et al., 2001: 
1375). The authors presume these institutional frameworks (if not concrete institutions) to 
be persistent, so that settler mortality would be a robust proxy for the quality of both 
early and current institutions. 
One gap in the Acemoglu et al. (2001) analysis is that the two steps in the 
argument (high European population mortality led to low European population densities, 
which led to extractive institutions) are not separately tested. Also, they do not examine 
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whether their result was driven mainly by the gap in economic performance between 
settler economies such as the US, Australia and New Zealand and colonies in Africa and 
Asia. This begs the question if extractive institutions explain performance also within a 
solely African context We return to both these issues in the empirical section 3. 
  
2.2. Legal Origins 
Djankov et al. (2002), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta et al. (1998) address the 
endogeneity problem besetting institutions by creating a measure of early, colonial-era 
institutions, which preceded developing-country current growth performance. Their 
measurement distinguishes between colonial institutions originating from different 
national legal systems. Again, the presumption is that once introduced, these systems do 
not change fundamentally and hence legal origin determines the qualities of also current 
institutions (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). in our context the differences between Africa’s 
most active colonisers would be relevant. Under French civil law, ‘professional judges, 
legal codes, and written records’ are typical while British common law is characterised 
by ‘lay judges, broader legal principle and oral argument’ (Glaeser and Shleifer 
2002:1193). Joireman (2006) questions this assumption and argues that there is 
significant heterogeneity within common-law countries. This also applies to colonies: she 
shows how Kenya and India – which both had common law systems imposed by the 
British coloniser - have very different colonial and post-colonial legal experiences. But in 
Djankov et al. (2002), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta et al. (1998), legal-origin 
differences are successfully linked to measures for present-day institutions including 
market regulation, property rights, quality of government, political freedom and financial 
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development. These concrete institutions, in turn, are shown to systematically relate to 
growth. 
 
2.3. Geography 
Yet another group of scholars links differences in economic development patterns to 
geographical factors. An important analytical advantage is the absence of serious 
endogeneity problems: geographical factors plausibly have some impact on economic 
growth, while growth has no or very little direct effect on geography. The four broad 
areas often cited relate to natural endowments, productivity, diseases, and transport costs 
(Sachs and Warner, 1997; Gallup et al. 1998; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Diamond, 1999; 
Sachs, 2001). 
Endowments of ‘point resources’ (principally oil, gas, diamonds, and precious 
metals) provide a growth potential which may be successfully exploited to raise income 
sustainably; but they are also notorious for leading to a ‘resource curse’ of political and 
economic instability related to rents. In contrast, endo ments with non-point, widespread 
natural resources such as sunshine, rainfall and soil fertility have historically constituted 
the most common geographical basis for broad-based and sustainable growth. This may 
account partly for Africa’s growth problems, as its location in the tropics implies that 
production conditions, particularly in agriculture, are less favourable and more variable 
than in temperate zones, due to fragile soils and little or infrequent rainfall. A third 
geographical factor is the incidence of plagues and pests which affect plants and animals 
(and thereby agricultural productivity) as well as the productivity of human labour. Such 
diseases (particularly, malaria) are unusually widespread in Africa and their impact is 
therefore more harmful than in most other parts of the world. Fourth, lack of access to 
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seaports or navigable rivers increases local transport costs; a third of all African countries 
are landlocked, comprising a quarter of its population (Sachs and Warner 1997, Gallup et 
al. 1998). Also, large distances to world markets increase the transport costs of trade. 
Over time, powerful feedback mechanisms may reinforce these barriers to 
economic development. Low agricultural productivity inhibits an ‘agricultural 
transformation’, which historically has been the basis for industrialisation, economic 
diversification and rising income levels in all now-developed countries (Timmer, 2002). 
Harsh living conditions lead to thinly settled countries and low incomes, which then 
constitute an endogenous drag on further growth, for example through demand 
limitations and larger costs (and lower returns) in infrastructure construction. Small 
domestic markets also inhibit scale-sensitive technological innovation, widening the 
‘ecological divide’ with developed countries that hinders the adoption of innovations 
through technology diffusion (Sachs, 2001:22). 
 
2.4. Human Capital 
The human capital angle on growth in former colonies has recently been argued by 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2003), based on early work by Schultz (1961), 
Lipset (1959, 1960), Dewey (1916) and others. As it is the focus of this paper, we discuss 
it in some detail. 
The term human capital was defined by its originator Theodore Schultz (1961:1) 
as ‘skills and knowledge’ which are ‘a form of capital’ and are ‘in substantial part a 
product of deliberate investment’. He also posited the link with economic growth, 
observing that ‘increases in economic output have been large in comparison with 
increases in land, man-hours and physical reproducible capital. Investment in human 
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capital is probably the major explanation for this difference’ (1961:1). Education can be 
viewed as one such investment in human capital, another one being, for example, health 
care (Schultz, 1999:67). Our focus is on the education component of human capital.  
The key observation in the human capital angle on the colonial roots of Africa’s 
growth, then, is not that settlers took ‘institutional fundaments’ with them. They took 
themselves, their human capital, and the means to proliferate the education component of 
that human capital through their educational systems. As in the Acemoglu et al (2001) 
account, there is a link with the density of settlement by colonisers, but it does not run via 
extractive institutions. Instead, the relevant reasoning here is that where fewer settlers 
went to stay, less of their human capital was brought and developed via educational 
systems (Lloyd et al. 1999: 17). Thus the idea is that the colonisers’ initial human capital 
endowment and its proliferation affected long-term economic development. This links in 
with Krueger and Lindahl (2001:1105) who, reviewing the literature on education and 
growth, conclude that ‘the initial level of education [is] positively correlated with 
economic growth’. For Africa, the corollary would be that ‘[l]ow levels of health and 
education are two salient factors contributing to [Africa’s] slow growth’, as Schultz 
(1999:67-68) notes. 
Some observers question the relevance of education to growth, since the returns to 
education are typically low in agrarian societies (as most colonies were) relative to its 
return in more diversified economies (Galor et al. 2006, Pritchett 2000, Bennel 1996). 
For Africa at least, this is contradicted by the Appleton and Balihuta (1996) overview of 
studies on the link between education and agricultural productivity in Africa. They 
conclude that the estimated effects are positive and often very large economically (though 
not always statistically significant) (Appleton and Balihuta 1996: 420). But apart from 
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this, the human capital school has emphasised that the key benefits of human capital are 
‘not technological but political’ (Glaeser et al. 2004:282). Early writers argued that 
education ‘broadens man’s outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of 
tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity 
to make rational electoral choices’ (Lipset 1960:39). Educated people are purportedly 
more aware of government actions, more actively participating in society, and better able 
to organise themselves politically and to resolve their conflicts ‘through negotiation and 
voting rather than through violent disputes’ (Glaeser et al. 2004:272; also, Lipset 1960, 
Bourguignon and Verdier 2000, Tilly 1998). Education, in this view, is also a 
precondition for a well-functioning judicial and administrative system. 
Yet other critics question this benign role of education in fostering economic 
growth and development, as it may also give rise to political instability, ethnic tensions 
and chronic violence. Huntington (1968:41) already observed that ‘modernity breeds 
stability, but modernization breeds instability’: he found that at low levels of literacy 
(roughly below 50 %), education breeds political instability while for countries with 
higher literacy rates it fosters stability. He went on to outline a mechanism where better 
educated people in developing countries with weak political systems are better able to 
organise protests, stage coups or foster other forms of political instability, which may 
impede economic growth. Bayly (2004:222) likewise writes of Britain’s preference for 
indirect rule in Africa in an attempt to ‘stifle the growth of English-educated elites like 
those who were causing such troubles in India and Egypt’.  
In another type of criticism, Bush and Santorelli (2000) document how education 
has been used by states for the purposes of cultural repression and segregation of ethnic 
minority groups. This includes colonial governments, who have used education for 
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cultural assimilation aims and for divide-and-rule politics. For instance, in Belgian 
Africa, the schooling system from the late 19th century ‘openly favoured the Tutsi 
minority and actively discriminated against the Hutu’ and during the 1920s ‘set up 
special schools to educate Tutsis as the future leaders of the country and … as support 
staff for the colonial government’ (Bush and Santorelli, 2000:10). They link this to the 
enduring ethnic tensions in the successor states Rwanda and Burundi, which erupted into 
violence and genocide in the early 1990s. Bush and Santorelli provide similar examples 
from Sudan, South Africa, Uganda, Zaire and for many other, non-African countries. 
Likewise, Davidson (1992) describes how the fact that African elites were typically 
Western-style educated alienated them from their compatriots - one reason for the 
legitimacy crisis of African governments, which in turn has hampered sustainable growth 
processes. Also quantitative other research confirms that the relation of education with 
growth is not simple and typically nonlinear, often mediated by other variables such as 
inequality, as in Rehme’s (2007) study. 
This literature illustrates that education can indeed have long-term influence, for 
good as well as for harm. On balance however, these effects appear not sufficiently 
strong to make education’s effect on economic growth negative on average. A large body 
of empirical research on that relation in the last half century finds that more and better 
education is robustly associated with higher levels of economic growth (Gemmel, 1996; 
Topel, 1999, Krueger and Lindahl, 2001), often conditional on other factors such as 
capital investment and the trade regime (Judson, 1998; Vinod and Kaushik, 20071. 
Schultz (1999) presents an overview of findings relevant to Africa. Beyond this specialist 
literature, the role of education in creating the ‘wealth  of nations’ is also a mainstay in 
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the general study of factors fostering economic growth, from Adam Smith to David 
Landes’ (1997) celebrated Wealth and Poverty of Nations. 
We build on these results by looking back to colonial times. Taking our cues from 
the human capital literature, we hypothesise that colonial education may have fostered 
long-term growth through two channels: both by affecting present education levels, and 
through its effect on political institutions, fostering stability, ‘voice’, and good 
governance (especially, secure property rights and law and order). In support of this link, 
Lipset (1960) found that the least educated societies are never stable democracies, 
whereas highly educated societies generally are. This was updated and confirmed by 
Glaeser et al. (2004), who also find a strong effect of initial education on institutional 
changes. 
It is important to note that we restrict our analysis to colonial education, and this 
is a limitation of the present research. Obviously, also pre-colonial, indigenous education 
systems – such as education by village elders, the extended family or in an indigenous 
religious setting (Adeyemi and Adeyinka, 2003) – invest people with social and cognitive 
skills and knowledge, and thus may build their human capital and so contribute to, among 
other things, economic growth. Or alternatively, they may have interacted with (hindered 
or fostered) the development of colonial education systems. Such indigenous education 
systems predated and often co-existed with colonial education efforts, and may have been 
important because the reach of colonial administration and education systems was often 
limited. As Bayly (2004:254) notes of colonial administration in general, ‘[w]hole areas 
of the European colonial world … remained in the grip of resistance to central authority, 
and the power of local chieftains until the very beginnings of decolonization itself in the 
1940s.’ In this environment, state-colonial education systems must have been only one of 
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many influences on human capital, and indigenous education systems may have been 
equally (or more?) determining to human capital formation as was colonial education.. 
But as indigenous education systems varied greatly over communities and were 
often not formalised, it is difficult to systematically take them into account in a 
quantitative cross-country analysis - even if there were reliable cross-country data. And 
even apart from data issues, also conceptually the impact of pre-colonial education on 
colonial education is a vast topic in itself, mediated and shaped as that relation is by 
environmental factors such as population density, the spread of Islam with its rival 
schooling system, and the different policies of colonisers (see also Lange et al. 2006). For 
reasons of scope and delineation we therefore consider it beyond this paper to treat it in 
any detail; but we return to this issue in our concluding section 5 as an avenue for future 
research. 
We limit this study to a test of the effect of colonial human capital  on subsequent 
growth in former African colonies. We do however include control variables (relating to 
legal origins, extractive institutions and geography). We will explicitly test in section 4 
the two ‘human capital’ channels suggested in the literature. But first we turn to a 
consideration of the context. 
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3. Colonial and Post-Colonial Education and Development in Africa: Historical 
Background 
 
We organise our discussion of colonial education systems around the main distinction in 
our sample, which is the difference between educational policies by the British and the 
French colonising powers. The spread of European-style education in the territories they 
colonised was part of the late 19th and early 20th century process of empire building, in 
which the British and French vied for control over large parts of the African continent: 
formal education rates increased rapidly once the ‘scramble for Africa’ truly began in the 
1880s, and indeed spread most quickly in contested areas. For instance Tanzania, handed 
to the British empire by the League of Nations after the First World War, and not 
threatened by the ambitions of rival colonisers, continued to have the lowest primary 
enrolment rates in all British Africa. 
The two major European powers operated with distinct styles and educational 
outcomes. Benavot and Riddle (1988) calculate enrolment rates per school age population 
for different years before 1940, and find on average considerably higher figures in British 
Africa compared to French West Africa and Equatorial French Africa (see also Bowman 
and Anderson 1963). This difference in outcomes can be plausibly linked to the complex 
interaction, in both the French and British colonies, of their two most powerful 
institutions: the state, represented by the colonial administration system; and the church, 
represented by missionary educators. 
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3.1 Colonial Administration 
The British exercised ‘indirect rule’ in Africa (Lugard 1929), where traditional structures 
and institutions were left intact and colonial rulers attempted to work with traditional 
chiefs. Within the colonial superstructure, chiefs maintained direct power over their 
peoples and lands (Lugard 1919). Indirect rule was motivated by pragmatism and by the 
aim of reducing the costs of colonial administration (Bayly 2004:222), and was 
characterised by a relative tolerance towards local customs compared to other colonial 
powers (Lugard 1929 and Wesseling 1991, Lloyd et al. 1999). The British did not 
introduce one centralised educational policy in their colonies but instead largely left it to 
missionaries to provide the population with education and to decide whether to educate 
also in the vernacular (Crowder 1964).  
Missionaries had already laid the foundation of the schooling system before 
colonisation properly started, and the British government realised that they where the 
only party who had the organisation (and the motivation) to ‘bear the brunt of the work in 
the early period’ (Cowan et al 1965: 3). This attitude changed only after the First World 
War, when the colonial administration faced increasing needs for an educated 
administrative workforce. In a policy memorandum published shortly after the First 
World War, the British government announced that it ‘reserved to itself the general 
direction and supervision of educational policy’ and that ‘voluntary agencies should be 
used in education’ to which grants in aid were to be made if they ‘conformed to the 
established standards’ (Cowan et al. 1965:6). The colonial government increasingly 
involved itself in the content of educational programmes as it used inspection and 
supervision to monitor the spending of its funds. This larger involvement was partly also 
a response to growing concerns in the internationally community – expressed particularly 
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in the League of Nations – about the quality and accessibility of colonial education 
(Cameron 1970, Cowan et al. 1965). 
The major aim of British colonial schooling, then, was to provide Africans with 
some minimal level of education and additionally build administrative capabilities of 
traditional chiefs (Lloyd et al. 1999, Sutton 1965). But education was not a ticket to 
upward mobility. Non ruling-class Africans who achieved higher education could not 
participate in the ruling of the colony (Collins 1970). Since the British wished to avoid an 
indigenous educated elite, colonial officials discouraged general education beyond the 
primary level. Cost considerations also played a role in the British administration 
preferring vocational training over general literacy and general education (Bayly 
2004:222, Wesseling 1991). 
In contrast, the French implemented an assimilation policy with the ultimate goal 
of providing non-Western peoples with ‘cultural characteristics that would make them 
acceptable as citizens on the same basis as their European fellow at home’ (Sutton 1965: 
63), while ‘degrading or ignoring [traditional] institutions in favour of French customs, 
culture and civilization’ (Collins, 1970: 162). Assimilation policies implied the 
imposition of direct, centralized French control, including a centralised educational 
policy. By the beginning of the 20th century all schools were obliged to teach in French 
and to adopt the French school curriculum (Lloyd et al. 1999, Cowan et al. 1965). 
Also in contrast to the British, the French colonial government divested 
indigenous chiefs of their power by creating new administrative units (cantons) which 
typically cut through traditional boundaries. Chiefs did keep their nominal positions but 
were assigned to cantons on the basis of their education or demonstration of loyalty to the 
French (Crowder 1964). The reward to obtaining education was thus admittance to the 
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lower echelons of the administration system (Collins 1970). Since most positions in the 
colonial administration were to be filled by French nationals, trained in France, the 
colonial government selected those who received advanced schooling with care, fearful 
of unemployed higher educated Africans. A small elite excepted, pupils in the French 
colonial schools received training in basic skills only (Lloyd et al. 1999). 
Like the British colonial government, and largely for the same reasons, the French 
colonial government gradually increased its investments in education after the First 
World War. But until the end of the Second World War, the basic pattern established in 
the French colonies already by the turn of the century did not change (Cowan et al. 
1965:9).   
 
3.2 Missionary Education 
Beginning in the 16th century, missionaries had brought European-style education to 
Africa. During the first decades of colonisation, the British colonial government was 
mainly occupied with maintaining law and order and missionaries remained the only 
party active in providing formal education to African people in the British colonies 
(Cameron 1970). An additional factor for leaving education to the missionaries was the 
British desire, noted above, to contain the cost of colonial administration (Lugard 1929, 
Bayly 2004). In contrast, the French Third Republic (1870-1940) enshrined the 
separation of state and church in its constitution. While this was reflected in widespread 
antipathy towards missionary education in the colonies, in practice, this resentment was 
tempered by the government’s recognition of the valuable role of missionary education in 
the government’s assimilation agenda. So was created a dual church-state educational 
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system, where missionary schools received state funding and functioned alongside state 
schools, adhering to the French state’s centralised educational policy. 
The presence of missionary (rather than only state) schools arguable helped the 
spread of Western-style education in the colonies. Both the Catholics in French Africa 
and the predominantly Protestant (Anglican, but also other) missionaries in British Africa 
realised, in the words of Bishop Joseph Shanahan, ‘that those who hold the school hold 
the country, hold its religion, hold its future’ (as cited by Berman 1975: 22). Between 
various churches, rivalry existed to reach as many people as possible. Helped by 
improved means of communication, this stimulated the rapid spread of missionary 
educational work in the first half of the 20th century, with enduring results (Cameron 
1970). In those former French colonies where the missionary school system was more 
developed (Madagascar, Central African Republic, Cameroon, the Congo and Gabon), 
the overall post-colonial enrolment rates were highest (Debeauvais 1964; and Benavot 
and Riddle, 1988). Missionary activity was even more determining to long-term 
educational achievements in British Africa, were education was largely the domain of the 
churches.  
If the role of the churches within colonial education was markedly different 
between French and British Africa, so were the missionaries. Unlike Catholic educators, 
Protestants missionaries generally considered their presence temporary since they 
envisioned independent, self-reliant indigenous churches (Berman 1975). This vision 
required a relatively high standard of fairly broad-based education, from which a future 
African church leadership could emerge. Also, due to the larger emphasis on individual 
bible study in Protestant theology, Protestant missionaries placed more value on 
spreading the key skill of reading among the whole population. 
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Both the colonial administration and the missionaries responded to most Africans’ 
initially hostile reaction to Western education differently, depending on the nature of the 
local indigenous religion. In Muslim areas animosity to Western education was usually 
respected and educational efforts restricted or abandoned. Large parts of Western Africa 
were Islamicised already before the French arrival, and the French did not replace Islamic 
education with their own system. In contrast, areas with traditionally animistic religions 
were nearly all Christianised eventually, and schooling was an important instrument in 
the process. 
This policy had long-term consequences. As an illustration, the animistic southern 
part of Nigeria was Christianised, while Christian missionary activity in the Muslim areas 
of Northern Nigeria was forbidden (Sutton 1965). In consequence, by 1958 over 90 
percent of the southern children were enrolled in primary schools, in contrast to only 9 
percent in the northern part (Ogunsheye 1965; Morgan and Armer 1988). As Benavot and 
Riddle (1988), Daun (200), Hanson II (1989) and Harrison (1988) show, colonial 
education in French Africa, more of which covers traditionally Muslim areas than was the 
case in British Africa, was clearly more restricted by this policy. Similarly, within the 
French areas, predominantly Muslim West Africa shows lower formal educational 
achievements compared to formerly animistic Equatorial Africa. 
These differences in educational development have shown great stability over 
time (Brown 2000). African educational standards in colonial times2 correlate with 
Africa’s educational achievements in 19953, with an R2 of nearly 0.7. The post-colonial 
African distributions of educational achievements have been so persistent in part because 
many  kept strong linkages to their colonial foundation (Lloyd et al. 2000). Newly post-
colonial independent government typically had limited resources and many challenges 
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and therefore did not take on extensive educational reforms: they ‘hesitated to take over 
in toto a system it had not the resources to run’ as Cameron (1970: 25); and this reason 
for continuity has remained relevant since -  see Brown (2000) and Ntiri (1993). This 
continuity lends partial support to our hypothesis that colonial education distributions had 
an enduring impact on growth patterns. In the next section we illustrate this claim by 
exploring the post-colonial  development of  educational systems in two countries: 
francophone Senegal and Anglophone Uganda. 
 
3.3 Educational Continuity and Economic Development Illustrated: Senegal and Uganda 
Senegal’s newly independent government inherited in 1960 the centralised educational 
system characteristic of French colonies, with a relative large role for state-run schools. It 
developed a new education policy aiming at free, universal and compulsory education 
(Cain et al. 1994). Successive governments planned further reforms in 1969, 1979 and 
1984 in order to develop a specifically African curriculum, to address issues of gender 
inequality and urban/rural inequalities, to promote instruction in a national language, and 
to provide more market-relevant skills. But as Evans (1994), Bakary (1995), and Cain et 
al. (1994) all document, few of these plans were actually implemented and much of the 
schooling system remained unchanged from the colonial period: most teaching is still in 
French and the curriculum is still French-style. Financial restraints and the entrenchment 
of elites benefitting from the status quo are among the reasons. 
The allocation of educational resources in Senegal is heavily biased against rural 
people: 93 percent of urban  children but only 10 to 34 percent of rural children were 
enrolled in schools during the 1990s (Cain et al. 1994). Senegal also has lower primary 
enrolment rates and higher secondary and tertiary enrolment rates than most francophone 
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African countries (Evans 1994). Starting from very low literacy rates in 1960 when only 
5 percent of the population could read, still in 1990 only 29 percent of adult population 
was literate, increasing to 39 percent in 2006 (UNESCO; World Development Indicators 
2006). Thus education has retained it colonial features of exclusivism and strong elitism, 
mainly benefitting the better-off urban minority.  
But despite these limitations and the relative inertia of the educational system 
since colonial times, there is evidence that Senegalese education is positively linked to 
economic development, for instance as measured by productivity in the manufacturing 
sector (accounting for around 18 percent of GDP) as Mbay (2002: 17) finds. 
Furthermore, Échevin and Murtin (2008:7) find that education is a productive input in all 
formal sectors as well as in the services and trade segments of the informal sector (which 
provides most employment in Senegal). Another education effect they find is that in 
informal firms, the employer’s level of education is positively associated with employee 
wage levels. 
 In sum, the ex-French colony which is now Senegal has both retained many of the 
colonial features in its educational system and has seen a positive contribution of 
education to output, productivity and wage levels. The reach of its educational system has 
remained limited, and so has the rate of its economic growth. 
 In contrast to Senegal, the British colony which is now Uganda had a colonial 
primary school system predominantly run by churches (Cameron 1970). Although the 
colonial government increasingly funded these schools to support educational expansion, 
only 46 children per 1,000 population went to school around 1950. Soon after Uganda 
became independent, the new government attempted to implement a more centralised 
educational system compared to the decentralised system it inherited from the British 
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(Cameron 1970).  It also laid heavier emphasis on primary education – a policy  which 
pushed up primary enrolment rates even in the 1970s and 1980s when Uganda went 
through serious economic and political turmoil. This trend was reinforced and accelerated 
when Museveni came to power in 1985, increasing the budget from the 10 percent it had 
been under the Amin government  to 23 percent (Byrnes, 1990). Literacy rates 
consequently rose from  25 percent in 1974 to 56 percent in 1990 and on to 67 percent in 
2006. 
But many aspects of the Ugandan schooling system remain similar to the colonial 
system despite these reforms -  as in Senegal, though not quite to the same extent. 
National exams determine the advancement from one level to the next, as is customary in 
the British system. The British curriculum remained in place until 1974, when it was 
replaced by a national curriculum. Instruction in local languages is common in the first 
few years of primary school in some regions (as it was during colonial times), but English 
is still the official language (Byrnes, 1990; StateUniversity, 2008).  
 As in Senegal, there is clear evidence that Uganda’s economic performance is 
linked to its educational achievements. Empirical studies find that the increase in 
educational coverage from the mid-1980s is reflected in rising agricultural productivity 
and in higher wages. Appleton and Balihuta (1996) argue that both general skills (for 
example numeracy and literacy) and specific knowledge enabled farmers to better 
implement productivity-enhancing polices such as fertiliser and pesticide applications. 
Using Uganda’s first nationally representative household survey, they find that the sum 
of the total years of primary schooling of farm workers increases farm output 
significantly. If farm workers had 4 years of schooling, output was 7 percent higher than 
if they had no schooling. Doubling the number of schooling years from seven to fourteen 
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years (equivalent to an increase from one primary graduate to two graduates) led to an 
estimated increase in output of 13 to 19 percent compared to the no schooling alternative 
(Appleton and Balihuta 1996: 426). Schooling was also found to have spill-over effects, 
where farmers with better educated neighbours tended to be more productive themselves. 
The results also show that secondary schooling does not lead to growth in farm 
productivity, and that there is very large variation in the education effects across 
Uganda’s regions (Appleton and Balihuta 1996: 424). Thus, this study finds that   
education can raise the productivity of farm workers in several ways. 
Appleton (2001) in another study finds that better education is associated with 
higher levels of household welfare, the effect depending on the level of education and the 
household’s portfolio of economic activities. Primary education is found to modestly 
raise the earnings in households engaged in agriculture, and more substantially raise 
earnings of households engaged in wage employment. It also opens up opportunities  to 
move into nonagricultural self-employment. In contrast to Appleton and Balihuta (1996), 
secondary schooling is found to raise agricultural productivity as well as wage incomes. 
University education only has an effect on the earnings from wage employment. Beyond 
primary education levels, further education induces a trade-off between losses in 
agricultural and non agricultural self employment income and increases in wages 
(Appleton 2001: 20). Thus education is also instrumental in the structural transformation 
from an agrarian livelihood towards participation in an industrial or service oriented 
economy. 
Summing up these two country narratives, in both Senegal and Uganda the legacy 
of colonial educational policies can still be discerned, especially in the value placed on 
universal (primary) education. While both countries officially adhere to the goal of 
Page 22 of 57
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 23 
providing universal education, only Uganda actually implemented policies to reach that 
goal while the Senegalese educational system remains more exclusivist and elitist. This 
parallels the more active British colonial polices towards a basic level of education for all 
(Lloyd et al. 2000) compare to the more passive French attitude to mass education. 
Uganda’s educational expansion can be consistently linked to its impressive  economic 
development over the last two decades, as Appleton (2001: 23) points out. In contrast in 
Senegal, Appleton and Teal (1999) argue, institutional restrictions and lack of investment 
in complementary factors of production (such as capital) have restricted the  opportunities 
for many people to work in the formal sector. But given the positive educational returns 
to productivity observed in the informal sector by Échevin and Murtin (2008), Senegal’s 
limited post-colonial increase in education did have a modest positive influence on its 
economic development. 
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4. Data and Analysis 
 
We use education data collected from the colonial yearbooks4 on the last years of African 
colonialism between 1945 and 1950 (Sudan was the first sub-Saharan country to gain 
independence in 1956) but before the European influence on the economic system started 
to decline (Hazlewood 1972; Giblin 1980; Hopkins 1973). Three variables from this data 
set are relevant to the present analysis: 
(i) and (ii) the percentage of Europeans per total population and the number of 
Europeans per square mile. A salient feature of this newly compiled data are that in the 
1940s, British colonies were on average about five times more densely populated than 
French colonies (27 as compared to 5 persons per square kilometre), but with 1 % of the 
total population, the British presence was still about twice as large as the French who 
formed 0.5 % of the population. 
(iii) the number of primary and secondary pupils per 1,000 population, which proxies 
investment in educational institutions following for example Easterlin (1981). As already 
noted in section 2, the ratio of total pupils to the population were clearly higher in British 
colonies5. 
 
The number of pupils per population will be our measure for educational human capital 
in colonial times. This measure is obviously not a perfect one – for instance, with its 
emphasis on coverage rather than quality it leaves important dimensions of colonial 
education unaccounted for. We therefore explored three alternatives in some detail. These 
are: the share of public investment from colonial budgets into the education system; 
literacy rates; and the pupils-to-teacher ratio as a proxy for educational quality. 
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In each case we ran into very serious data difficulties. One conceptual problem 
with the measure of budget shares for education is that it is an input measure which is 
only indirectly linked to the output of colonial educational achievements, which we are 
interested in. Additionally it varies with variations in total budgets, which need not reflect 
variations of actual resources allocated to education. For instance, where more 
expenditure went to increases in teacher salaries, this does not necessarily reflect an 
increase in the coverage or quality of education (Lloyd et al. 1999). Likewise, in the years 
after the Second World war, colonial governments changed their policies towards Africa 
and focused more on dev lopment. This shift in policy involved substantial changes in 
the level of public expenditure, also directed at the social sector (Hopkins 1973; 
Hazlewood 1953/54). Measuring it consistently over countries is not really possible, as 
French and British (let alone other) definitions for budget components differed 
substantially. For instance, the French colonial government ran a general budget and a 
budget for each separate country it occupied; but the British did not. In brief, we judged it 
not possible to construct reliable data for educational budget shares in colonial times. 
We found that the measure of pupil-to-teacher ratios, which would capture 
quality of education, was  available for 15 countries only – ranging from 134 in Burkina 
Faso to 15 in Mauritania. While this limited number of observations disqualifies the 
variable from our statistical analysis below, it does seem that pupil-to-teacher ratios are 
clearly and negatively correlated to long term growth, as would be expected in the 
‘human-capital’ view on Africa’s long-term growth. The correlation coefficient of pupil-
to-teacher ratios with 1995 GDP per capita levels is -0.33. 
Similarly, the measure of literacy rates would arguably be a better variable than 
pupils per population, as it is a more direct measure of educational achievement. 
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Unfortunately, to our knowledge literacy rates during colonial times are not available. 
The earliest literacy rates for only 19 sub-Saharan countries are available for 1960. This 
is ‘too little, too late’: only 19 observations from a time well after decolonialisation had 
started. Still, there is considerable correlation between our measure of pupils per 
population and literacy rates in 1960 (correlation coefficient 0.49). Moreover, correlation 
between literacy rates in 1960 and in 1990 and 2006 are 0.71 and 0.62 respectively, 
whereas correlation between pupils per population and literacy rates in 1990 and 2006 are 
0.72 and 0.69 respectively. In summary, pupils per population is the only variable for 
educational achievement that we could credibly construct from the colonial data; but the 
above explorations suggest that it also captures literacy levels. 
We apply these data to the question of Africa’s long-term growth in two ways. 
First, we explicitly check the two intervening steps in the Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
argument that higher settler mortality led to colonies being more thinly settled by 
Europeans and that a lower density of Europeans in the population led to different 
institutions, worse for long-term growth. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue this based on the 
literature but without primary empirical evidence. In Table 1 we show that both these 
relations cannot be detected for sub-Saharan Africa. This then leads us to the second 
application, to explore an alternative explanation for Africa’s long-term growth in an 
instrumental-variable estimation, using our measure of pupils per population. 
In Panel A of table 1 we report results from regressions of the density of 
Europeans in the population and density of Europeans per surface measure on settler 
mortality. Neither regression gives statistically significant results, and the negative R2 
indicate that models A1 and A2 perform worse than a constant-only model. In Panel B 
Page 26 of 57
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 27 
we regress the two index measures for colonial institutions used by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001)6 on the density of Europeans in the population, and again fail to find a relation. 
 
Table 1: The Links from Settler Mortality to European Densities to Institutions in Africa. 
 
Panel A: Colonial density of Europeans is not explained by settler mortality 
   
Independent: Europeans/population Europeans/km2  
     
 settler 
mortality 
-0.000  0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.007)  
(constant) 0.005  0.021  
 (0.007)  (0.040)  
     
R2 -0.06  -0.06  
N 18  18  
     
     
Panel B: Institutional quality is not explained colonial density of Europeans 
     
Independent: ‘Democracy’ ‘Democracy’ ‘Constraints on 
executive’ 
‘Constraints on 
executive’ 
     
Europeans/pop 88.665  49.778                 
 (53.862)  (36.587)                 
Europeans/km2  15.641  7.691    
  (9.902)  (6.778)    
(constant) 2.078*** 2.078*** 3.104*** 3.149*** 
 (0.709) (0.720) (0.482) (0.493)    
     
R2 0.069 0.061 0.036 0.012 
N 24 24 24 24 
Source: Settler mortality: Acemolgu et al. (2001), institutional variables: Polity IV, and authors’ 
calculations. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
These results in an African sample differ from those reported by Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
in a global sample of former colonies. This leads us to question the link between settler 
mortality and early institutions. While Acemoglu et al. (2001, footnote 21) report that 
there is a ‘weaker relationship between settler mortality and institutions in a sole Africa 
sample’, we actually find no relationship in an African sample. Naturally, our sample size 
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is necessarily small, especially for panel A results, and this may (partly) cause the lack of 
statistical significance. But at the least we conclude that there is no evidence that African 
colonial-era institutions are well proxied by settler mortality7. 
This is not to say that there cannot be a link between settler mortality and African 
growth, or that institutions are irrelevant in this relation; only that the account of this link 
presented by Acemoglu et al. (2001) finds no support in the African data. Alternatively, 
settler mortality may have influenced other aspects of colonial institutions than its 
extractiveness. We noted in section 2 above that one candidate for an alternative channel 
is colonial human capital. Glaeser et al. (2004), Djankov et al. (2003) and Lipset (1959, 
1960) suggested that colonial human capital may have influenced both colonial 
institutions and current human capital, and – through either or both of these channels – it 
may affect present GDP levels. It is this explanation of Africa’s long-term growth that we 
will now explore empirically. 
We start with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification  where we regress 
our human capital variable PUPILS (per 1,000 population) on PPP per capita GDP levels 
in 19958. We test robustness to other explanations by adding a legal-origin variable 
(COLONISER, which takes value 1 for British and 0 for French colonies) and up to four 
geographical variables from the following set: MALARIA (index of 1994 malaria 
prevalence), COASTPOP (the share of the population living within 100 km from the 
coast), LANDLOCKED9 (absence of overland access to sea), TROPICS (the share of 
territory located in the tropics)10 and HYCROCARBONS (proven reserves of natural gas 
and crude oil in 1993, BTUs per person). In selecting these variables, we follow La Porta 
et al. (2004) and Gallup et al. (1998). We take out one of these variables in turn and in 
Table 2 reports OLS estimation results. We find that in four of the seven specifications, 
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PUPILS significantly correlates with 1995 per capita GDP. Apparently OLS results are 
not robust to adding control variables; in addition, as noted they are plausibly biased 
because of endogeneity. Only MALARIA is consistently correlated with lower 1995 
income levels.  
 
Table 2: OLS regressions of Colonial Education and Controls on  1995 GDP per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
PUPILS 7.679** 7.011* 8.266* 4.673 8.446** 7.115 4.158  
 (3.708) (3.691) (4.000) (3.848) (3.949) (4.644) (3.288)  
        
COLONISER -0.246 -0.244 -0.302 -0.203 -0.282 -0.256               
 (0.283) (0.255) (0.264) (0.265) (0.267) (0.297)               
        
MALARIA  -1.235** -1.065** -0.933** -1.309**  -1.357*** 
  (0.466) (0.470) (0.406) (0.483)  (0.464)  
        
COASTPOP 0.776* 0.560 1.128  1.141 0.884  
  (0.439) (0.643) (0.672)  (0.769) (0.605)  
        
TROPICS  1.004 1.002  1.257 -0.181 0.929  
  (0.814) (0.853)  (0.827) (0.795) (0.798)  
        
HYDROCARBONS 0.047  0.055 0.033 0.028 0.046  
  (0.031)  (0.040) (0.037) (0.043) (0.033)  
        
LANDLOCK   -0.239 0.186 -0.325 0.155 0.008  
   (0.361) (0.448) (0.298) (0.503) (0.372)  
        
(constant) 7.084*** 7.044*** 6.933*** 7.686*** 7.100*** 6.978*** 7.136*** 
 (0.193) (0.725) (0.763) (0.482) (0.762) (0.845) (0.711)  
        
R2        
N 30 28 28 28 28 28 33  
        
Sources: Geographical data: Gallup et al (1998), Settler mortality data: Acemoglu et al. (2001), Colonizer 
data: La Porta et al. (2004), pupil data: authors’ calculations. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
Since the above analysis faces the same endogeneity challenges as the Acemoglu (2001) 
account, the question is whether the findings are robust to an alternative approach, 
addressing the endogeneity problem. We instrumented the colonial-era education 
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measure PUPILS (the percentage of pupils in the population) with settler mortality 
SETTMORT around 1800, as in Acemoglu et al. (2001). We then regress this 
instrumented human capital variable on PPP per capita GDP levels in 199511. Panel A in 
table 3 presents the second stage IV regression12. Panel B reports the corresponding first 
stage results. We test robustness to other explanations by adding controls, as above.  We 
include not more than five variables in total because of the limited number of 
observations (23) in this instrumented-variable  regression13 . 
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Table 3: Instrumented Colonial Education Correlates with 1995 GDP per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
 
Panel A – 2nd stage of 2SLS: regressing ln GDPpc in 1995 on PUPILS (instrument: settler 
mortality)and controls  
       
PUPILS (INST) 31.504*** 28.220*** 23.612* 26.590** 27.863** 30.144**  
 (11.759) (8.767) (13.918) (13.244) (13.012) (11.853)    
COLONIZER -0.593** -0.550** -0.502* -0.556* -0.570** -0.606**  
 (0.302) (0.268) (0.269) (0.291) (0.285) (0.290)    
MALARIA  -0.683* -0.701* -0.744* -0.709*                 
  (0.389) (0.398) (0.447) (0.376)                 
HYDROCARBONS 0.034 0.012 -0.001  -0.025    
  (0.030) (0.041) (0.039)  (0.035)    
COASTPOP  0.288                   
   (0.709)                   
LANDLOCKED    -0.207 -0.177 -0.193    
    (0.342) (0.370) (0.353)    
(constant) 6.536*** 7.244*** 7.264*** 7.347*** 7.281*** 6.593*** 
 (0.308) (0.504) (0.532) (0.704) (0.614) (0.374)    
       
       
R2 (%) 25 37 46 31 27 34 
N 30 28 28 28 28 33 
 
 
Panel B – 1st stage of 2SLS: regressing PUPILS on settler mortality and controls 
 
SETTMORT -0.011** -0.008** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008* -0.010**  
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
COLONIZER 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.010    
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)    
COASTPOP 0.040*** 0.038**                   
  (0.015) (0.015)                   
TROPICS  0.072 0.053 0.098 0.125 0.029    
  (0.082) (0.078) (0.094) (0.093) (0.086)    
HYDROCARBONS  0.002* 0.001  0.001    
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)    
LANDLOCKED    -0.011 -0.017 -0.008    
    (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)    
(constant) 0.087*** -0.010 0.018 -0.014 -0.045 0.061    
 (0.029) (0.086) (0.082) (0.096) (0.095) (0.090)    
       
R2 (%) 19 29 46 39 35 26                
N 24 23 23 23 23 23 
 
Sources: Geographical data: Gallup et al (1998), Settler mortality data: Acemoglu et al. (2001), Colonizer 
data: La Porta et al. (2004), pupil data: authors’ calculations. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
Page 31 of 57
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 32 
In model (1) we include only a colonial origin variable. In model (2) we add MALARIA 
and HYDROCARBONS, in model (3) also COASTPOP. In model (4) we replace 
COASTPOP with LANDLOCKED and in models (5) and (6) we run this model without 
HYDROCARBONS and MALARIA, respectively. We similarly vary control variables in 
the first stage equation. We find that variation in specification affects the model fit as 
expected, but not the key results. Panel B shows a significant negative effect of settler 
mortality on colonial education levels in all models, supporting the panel A 
specification14. And panel A shows that the instrumented PUPILS variable is positive 
associated with 1995 GDP levels in all specifications. 
We conclude that the link between settler mortality and GDP in 1995, which 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) conjectured to run through ‘extractive institutions’, in Africa is 
most likely to run through human capital investments made in the colonial era through 
education15. This conclusion is robust to including controls for geography and legal 
origin. It connects to the description given by Acemoglu et al. (2001: 1374-1375) of 
extractive institutions as inter alia involving low educational and healthcare investments; 
but in view of the lack of support for the intervening steps in the Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
argument, presented in table 1, this interpretation is tenuous for the African setting. A 
more plausible understanding of the findings is to see them as support for the hypothesis 
that human capital, as distinct from the broader framework of production-and-commerce 
oriented institutions, was the more important factor for long-term growth (Glaeser et al., 
2004). This view finds additional support in the lack of significant findings for 
institutional measures, such as ‘democracy’ and ‘constraints on the executive’ variables, 
reported in table 1. 
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In addition, our estimates offer support for the legal-origin explanation of growth: 
the coefficient is negative and significant, implying that British colonization is correlated 
with lower 1995 income levels than is French colonization16. However, the significance 
of this exogenous variable is not robust to an OLS specification in Table 2, perhaps 
because COLONISER captures some other systemic difference between British and 
French colonies other than legal origin; for instance, the qualitative differences in 
education systems noted in section 3. Another explanation is offered by Joireman (2006) 
who observes significant heterogeneity with respect to colonial and post-colonial legal 
experiences within the group of British (ex-) colonies. This reality may undermine a 
single ‘COLONISER’ effect. Of the geographical variables, MALARIA is a robustly 
negative influence on growth, both in OLS and IV specifications. 
Having established a robust relation of colonial education with current per capita 
income levels, we now pursue the ‘educational’ line of reasoning further by examining 
the additional hypotheses that (i) colonial education achievements persisted (that is that 
colonial education achievements statistically ‘cause’ present educational levels) and that 
(ii) colonial human capital caused colonial institutions. On (i), table 4 shows that 
instrumented education levels in the 1940s correlate to present enrolment rates, both 
primary and secondary17. Thus, a first channel through which exogenous, colonial-era 
investments in human capital have affected present growth is through the ‘persistence 
effect’ mentioned above, by durable increases in levels of human capital till the present. 
It is important to note that human capital persisted over time, while institutional measures 
did not, as discussed above. This is in contradiction to the argument put forward by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) on the durability of institutional quality, but it is in line with the 
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Glaeser et al. (2004:274) argument that human capital is ‘the more basic cause of 
growth’. 
 
Table 4: Colonial Human Capital Persisted 
 
 
IV regression of colonial human capital on present human capital 
 
   
 
Panel A – Second stage of 2SLS: regressing PUPILS (instrument: settler 
mortality) 
on primary and secondary enrolment rates in 1995 
 
   
2nd stage dependent: PRIM95 SEC95 
   
Constant 0.843** -0.096 
 (0.342) (0.206) 
PUPILS 35.634*** 15.060*** 
 (9.246) (5.561) 
 
 
  
first stage dependent: PUPILS PUPILS 
 
Panel B - First stage of 2SLS: regressing settler mortality on PUPILS 
 
   
   
Constant 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
SETTMORT -0.013** -0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
   
Obs. 19 19 
R2 0.63 0.49 
 
Source: education data: Barro and Lee (2001), settler mortality data: Acemoglu et al (2001), pupils data: 
colonial yearbook and authors’ calculations. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Finally in table 5 we explore another channel by examining the influence of human 
capital investments on contemporaneous institutional indicators. We consider 
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institutional indices both on democracy and on constraints on the executive as used by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), and find positive and significant correlations of PUPILS with 
both in an OLS framework. These findings are however not robust to using instrumented 
education, so that the results may be partly driven by endogeneity of education to 
institutions18. We conclude that the major channel through which colonial education 
affects current growth is though the persistence effect in educational quality, more than 
through institutional quality.  
 
Table 5: Colonial Education and Current Institutions 
 
OLS regression of current institution on colonial education levels 
Dependent: DEMOCRACY75 CONSTRAINT 
   
Constant 1.154 2.641*** 
 (0.733) (0.501) 
PUPILS 37.990*** 19.086** 
 (13.346) (9.133) 
   
N 37 37 
R2 0.16 0.09 
Source: institutional data: Polity IV, pupil data: author’s calculations. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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5. Summary, Future Research and Conclusions 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) conjecture that high settler mortality led colonising powers to 
introduce ‘extractive ‘institutions, which set the economy on a long-term path of low and 
volatile growth. Low settler mortality, in contrast, supposedly caused colonisers to build 
institutions more conducive to growth. When we implement this analysis for a sample of 
only African countries, both these correlations disappear. Higher settler mortality did not 
lead to African colonies being more thinly settled by Europeans, and a lower density of 
Europeans in the population did not lead to different institutions, worse for long-term 
growth. While it is noteworthy that these findings might well be due to small sample size, 
they leave sufficient room to pursue an alternative explanation of long-term growth 
differences between African countries, based on colonial education rather than colonial 
extractive institutions. We collect archival material from colonial yearbooks to construct 
a novel data set on European and total population densities and investments that the 
colonial powers made in schooling. 
In our analyses we find that African colonial education does possess both 
properties ascribed to institutions in the global Acemoglu et al (2001) study: it correlates 
well both with settler mortality and with current measures for human capital. 
Instrumenting education with settler mortality, we obtain again a robust explanation of 
long-term development which does not suffer from endogeneity and which is specific to 
Africa. We establish the robustness of this explanation by introducing controls for the 
legal origin of institutional systems and for a number of geographical variables, both of 
which have additional explanatory power. Further investigation of the channels through 
which education fostered growth suggests its positive impact on both current education 
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and on colonial institutions, though the causality between colonial institutions and 
colonial education seems two-way. 
There are several loose ends to this study, which provide opportunities for future 
research. A big one relates to a relatively neglected issue in this strand of literature: what 
was there before colonialism19? Obviously pre-colonial Africa was not tabula rasa with 
respect to education. A next step is this literature would therefore be to enlarge the scope 
of analysis one step further compared to the Acemoglu et al. (2001) and similar 
frameworks (including this one) by noting that long-term growth may have depended not 
only on colonial education, but also on pre-colonial African education levels. In line with 
the human capital definition, this would include organized efforts by Africans to create or 
pass on skills and knowledge that contributed to long-term growth of their economies – 
either directly or by providing a basis for colonial education systems to be more rapidly 
or slowly. One might conjecture, for instance, that peoples used to education of some sort 
were more willing to have their children attend colonial schools; or conversely, that 
indigenous and colonial education were rivals and so the presence of pre-colonial 
education hampered the spread of colonial education. But as in the present study, a 
simple causal approach would be amiss in that it ignores an endogeneity problem similar 
to the one addressed in this paper. Namely, pre-colonial education cannot be assumed to 
simply determine (positively or negatively) colonial education; instead, both are plausibly 
jointly caused by underlying factors. 
In light of the literature reviewed in this paper, one might speculate about two 
strong candidates for this underlying factor: Islam and population density. Societies were 
Islam  - a ‘religion of the book’ - had spread before Western colonisation arrived, were 
more likely to have more extensive pre-colonial formal schooling systems and higher 
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literacy levels. Bayly (2004:261), writing on pre-colonial states, observes that ‘in Muslin 
West Africa, the state crept forward in alliance with elite literacy and the spread of purist 
Islam’. At the same time, as we noted in section 3, colonisers restricted colonial 
education in Islamic areas. So ‘Islam’ may well be a factor jointly fostering pre-colonial 
and hindering colonial education systems. A second candidate for the underlying factor is 
population density, which is one sign of a society’s potential for economic and social 
development, including the development of schooling systems. Population density may 
also be systematically related to origin of the coloniser. We learn this, for instance, from 
Lange et al. (2006) who explain that ‘Britain tended to colonize most extensively 
precolonial regions that were sparsely populated and underdeveloped’ (p 1412). This is in 
comparison to the Spanish; in our data we detect that British colonies (mostly in east 
Africa) were far more densely populated than other, predominantly French colonies, 
many in arid West Africa. The densities are 27 and 5 persons per square kilometre, 
respectively, and the correlation coefficient between population density and British origin 
is a high + 0.26. In section 3 we describe how Britain also achieved higher enrolment 
rates in its colonial schools than did the French, partly by making more use of missionary 
education. Combining these facts, we have again that population density is an influence 
both on colonial education and on pre-colonial education – in this case, both influences 
are positive. 
In light of these supposed two underlying factors, ‘Islam’ and ‘population 
density’, with opposite effects on pre-colonial education, a further observation is that pre-
colonial education itself is far from homogeneous. The most important distinction may 
well be between types of pre-colonial education linked to the spread of Islam and with 
more emphasis on formal schooling and literacy; and informal, indigenous pre-colonial 
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education which had developed in Africa itself, plausibly in settled communities with 
high population densities. Valuable follow-up research would be to investigate how 
different kinds of pre-colonial education affected colonial education, and so indirectly 
shaped the long-term economic fortunes of Africa. 
This is an avenue for future research. The contribution of this study was to 
suggest and substantiate that African colonial education levels are among the long-term 
determinants of African economic growth. A more general implication is that the human-
capital explanation of growth appears a fruitful issue to be explored in the development 
literature. 
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1
 Obviously, this is not to say that education is therefore an unmixed blessing; the formation 
of human capital enabling economic growth may still co-exists with for example cultural 
repression perpetuated through educational systems. 
2 Total number of pupils divided by total population. See appendix B for sources. 
3 Average years of primary schooling in the total population over age 15, taken from the 
Barro and Lee data set (Barro and Lee 2001). 
4 See Appendix B for sources. 
5
 We present an overview of key statistics in the data Appendix A. 
6
 As proxies for colonial-era institutions Acemoglu et al. (2001) used a democracy index at 
the first year of independence, varying between the 1950’s and 1975, an index measure for 
constraint on the executive at first year of independence, where more constraints reflect better 
institutions. 
7
 An important reason underlying this result may also be that the stability over time of 
institutions assumed in Acemoglu et al. (2001) should be questioned in the African context. 
African colonial-era institutions do not correlate well with current institutions (which cause 
current GDP). Twenty-four of the 44 African countries included in the Polity IV data 
experienced shortly after independence an (often sharp) decline in the democracy index used 
here and in Acemoglu et al. (2001). Of the 14 countries with a low initial measure for 
‘constraint on the executive’, 6 countries showed an appreciable improvement subsequently. 
This volatility links in with a cross-country analyses of institutional indices by Glaeser et al. 
(2004) who note that these index measures tend to reflect short-term changes (for example 
election results) rather than the stabler, underlying institutions. 
8
 We chose 1995 to allow comparison to Acemoglu et al (2001). 
9
 Note that including COASTPOP and LANDLOCKED does not amount to  the same thing 
since they are quite different variables. There are countries with coastlines (LANDLOCK=0) 
such as Kenya, but with coastal populations of only 6 percent. Compare also Mozambique 
(40 %), Sudan (2%) and Tanzania (16%) ( Gallup et al. 1998:31) 
10
 TROPICS has little variation within Africa, with many values equal or close to 100 %. 
Excluding it improves the significance of findings, without qualitatively changing them. 
11
 We chose 1995 to allow comparison to Acemoglu et al (2001). 
12
 We combine an instrumental variable approach with generalized least squares, which 
accounts for the correlation structure in the disturbances across equations. This procedure, 
also known as ‘three stage least squares’, results in consistent estimates that are more 
efficient than 2sls without using the information contained in cross-equation correlations of 
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disturbances. We estimated our equations also without GLS (i.e. ’simple’ 2sls), which 
produces qualitatively identical, but less significant estimates, as expected. See Kmenta 
(1977) and Greene (2003) for more detail. 
13
 An instrumented  model without control variables, regressing LOG GDP pc in 1995 only 
on PUPILS (instrumented with SETTMORT) plus a constant, yields a similar coefficient 
estimate (0.24.941) and significance levels (s.e. is 12.897) for PUPILs as model (1), but has a 
negative R2 indicating under-specification.  
14
 Instrumenting colonial human capital with other (legal-origin or geographical) exogenous 
variables did not yield statistically significant explanations of 1995 GDP. Although colonial 
education does correlate with several of the exogenous variables considered here, only settler 
mortality is a suitable instrument for human capital variables in an equation explaining 1995 
GDP. Results from these additional analyses are available on request from the authors.  
15
 Our newly compiled data set allowed us to also consider health, another dimension of 
human capital. In IV and OLS regressions of HOSPITALS, a measure for colonial healthcare 
(the number of hospitals per 1000 population health), again using settler mortality as the 
instrument, on 1995 GDpc, HOSPITAL yields a valid instrumental-variable explanation of 
present GDP levels. But model performance is very weak, with a  negative R2 indicating  that 
a constant-only model would predict better. Also, the relation between colonial health and  
present pc GDP relation was not robust to introducing controls. 
16
 Interestingly, Lange et al.(2006:1412) find that ‘British colonization had comparatively 
positive effects’ on economic development, that is compared to Spanish colonization. 
17
 Average years of primary schooling in the total population over age 15, taken from the 
Barro and Lee data set  (Barro and Lee 2001). Using World Development Indicators as the 
source yields similar results. 
18
 Results from the 2SLS analysis are available on request from the authors. 
19
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this. 
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 Appendix A: Geographical and Institutional Data 
 
We thank Acemoglu for kindly providing the data on which the Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
results are based; and Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger for making their data on which the 
Gallup et al. (1998) results are based available on the Internet. 
 
Data description 
 
Variable 
 
Year 
 
Source 
 
Settler Mortality 1800-1850 Acemoglu et al, 2001  
   
Settler mortality is potential settler mortality measured in terms of deaths per annum per 1000 'mean 
strength' (raw mortality numbers are adjusted to what they would be if a force of 1000 living people 
were kept in place for a whole year). 
 
Democracy at first year of independence before 1975 Various years Polity IV 
Democracy indicator based on the competitiveness of political participation, openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the executive. Scale between 0 and 10, 
where higher scores indicate more democracy. Year of observation is the first year of independence 
as long as that is before 1975, otherwise the country gets a score of 1 (in line with Acemoglu et al 
2001). 
 
Constraint on the executive before 1975 Various years Polity IV 
Measure of the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivises. Scale between 0 and 7, where higher scores indicate 
more constraints. Year of observation is the first year of independence as long as that is before 1975, 
otherwise the country gets a score of 1 (in line with Acemoglu et al 2001). 
 
 
PopCoast 1994 Gallup et al 1998 
Proportion of the population living within 100 km of the coastline. 
 
Landlocked dummy  Gallup et al 1998 
A binary dummy, with a value one indicating landlockedness 
  
Malaria index 1966, 1994 Gallup et al 1998 
Index of Malaria prevalence based on a global map of extent of malaria in 1966 (WHO 1967), and the 
fraction of falciparum malaria. 'The index is the product of the fraction of land area subject to malaria 
times the fraction of falciparum malaria cases'. (Gallup et al 1998) 
 
 
 
Life expectancy 1965 
 
1965 
 
Gallup et al 1998 
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Data Gallup et al took form the United Nations 
   
Tropic 1996 Gallup et al 1998 
The proportion of a country's land area within the geographical tropics 
 
LEGALORIGIN   
Binary dummy, where value one indicates a former 
British colony. 
  Authors 
Hydrocarbons 1993 Gallup et al 1998 
Hydrocarbon deposits are total BTU's per person of proven crude oil and natural gas reserves in 
1993, which Gallup et al collected from World Resource Database (1996-1997) 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Collected Colonial Data  
 
Our newly constructed date set is comprised of data on former British and French 
colonies in Africa. Based on colonial yearbooks of the years 1945-1955 (detailed sources 
are below), we calculated variables that could serve as proxies for the general 
institutional environment between 1945 and 1950. The data set consists of four modules: 
a) population density and European presence (calculated as density per squared kilometre 
and as the proportion of Europeans to total population) in countries is collected. 
b) human capital: school pupils as a proportion to total population.  
 
 
Sources 
 
French West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal) 
Annuaire Statistique de L’Afrique Occidentale Francaise, 
1949 Volume 4, and 1950 à 1955 Volume 5 
French Equatorial Africa (Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Gabon) 
 Annuaire Statistique de L'Afrique Equatoriale Française, 
1936-1950 Volume 1, 1951 à 1955 Volume 2 
Madagascar Annuaire Statistique de Madagascar, 1938 - 1951, Vol. 1 
Botswana 
 
  
Official Year Book of the Union [of South Africa] and of 
Basutoland [Lesotho], Bechunanaland Protectorate 
[Botswana] and Swaziland, 1950 no 26. 
Ghana Economic and Statistical Bulletin of the Gold Coast, April 
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  Digest of Statistics, November 1953, No. 4 
Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1955 
Lesotho 
 
  
Official Year Book of the Union [of South Africa] and of 
Basutoland [Lesotho], Bechunanaland Protectorate 
[Botswana] and Swaziland, 1950 no 26. 
Malawi 
 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Census of 
Population 1956 
  Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1955, Vol 2, No. 1 
 
 
Mauritius 
 
 
Final report on the Census Enumeration made in the 
Colony of Mauritius and its Dependencies on 11th June, 
1944 
 
Blue Book of the Colony of Mauritius and its 
Dependencies, 1946/1947 
 Yearbook of Statistics, 1959 No. 14.  
Nigeria Blue Book for the year ending 31st December, 1938. 
 Digest of Statistics, Vol. 2, October 1952, No. 1 and 4. 
  Digest of Statistics 1956 
Sudan 
Foreign Trade Report (with some internal statistics), 
1949 
 
First population census of Sudan 1955/56, Final Report, 
vol. 1 
 Swaziland 
 
Official Year Book of the Union [of South Africa] and of 
Basutoland [Lesotho], Bechunanaland Protectorate 
[Botswana] and Swaziland, 1950 no 26. 
Tanzania Statistical Abstract, 1938-1952 (Tanganyika) 
Uganda Statistical Abstract, 1957 
Zambia 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Census of 
Population 1956 
  Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1955, Vol. 2, No. 1 
 
Economic and Statistical Bulletin (Northern Rhodesia), 
February 1953, Vol. 5, No. 11 
Zimbabwe 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Census of 
Population 1956. 
 
 
Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1955, Vol 2, No. 1 
Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia, 1952, No. 4 
   
Additional data on Education Mitchell, B.R. (2003) 4th edition 
The Statesman’s Year-Book (1946, 1948, 1955). 
  
  
 
 
 
Variable description and availability 
Variable Description Year    Source   
1948-55 Population 
Density 
Total population per squared 
kilometre  
French West Africa (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
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   1950-55 
    
    
French Equatorial Africa (Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Republic, Gabon) 
   1946-51 Madagascar  
   1948-53 Ghana   
   1947-51 Kenya   
   1946-51 Malawi   
   1946-47 Mauritius   
   1938-50 Nigeria   
   1936,46,50 Botswana   
   1936,46,50 Lesotho   
   1949-55 Sudan   
   1936,46,50 Swaziland   
   1947-52 Tanzania   
   1947-51 Uganda   
   1946-51 Zambia   
   1946-51 Zimbabwe   
       
1948-55 European 
density 
Total European population per 
squared kilometre  
    
French West Africa (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal) 
   1950-55 
    
    
French Equatorial Africa (Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Republic, Gabon) 
   1946-51 Madagascar  
   1948-53 Ghana   
   1947-51 Kenya   
   1946-51 Malawi   
   1946-47 Mauritius   
   1938-50 Nigeria   
   1936,46,50 Botswana   
   1936,46,50 Lesotho   
   1949-55 Sudan   
   1936,46,50 Swaziland   
   1947-52 Tanzania   
   1947-51 Uganda   
   1946-51 Zambia   
   1946-51 Zimbabwe   
       
European 
pop 1948-55 
 
Total European population as 
percentage of total population 
 
    
French West Africa (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal) 
   1950-55 
    
    
French Equatorial Africa (Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Republic, Gabon) 
   1946-51 Madagascar  
   1948-53 Ghana   
   1947-51 Kenya   
   1946-51 Malawi   
   1946-47 Mauritius   
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   1938-50 Nigeria   
   1936,46,50 Botswana   
   1936,46,50 Lesotho   
   1949-55 Sudan   
   1936,46,50 Swaziland   
   1947-52 Tanzania   
   1947-51 Uganda   
   1946-51 Zambia   
      1946-51 Zimbabwe     
       
Education 1948-
1950/51 
  
 
Total students in primary and 
secondary education to total 
population 
 
French West Africa (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo) 
   1950-52 
    
    
French Equatorial Africa (Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Republic, Gabon) 
   1947-49 Madagascar  
Gambia 
   
1945 
1945-47 Ghana   
   1947-49 Kenya   
   1947-50 Malawi   
   1947-49 Mauritius   
   1949-50 Nigeria   
   1947-49 Botswana   
   1947-49 Lesotho   
   1947-49 Sudan   
   1948-50 Swaziland   
   1947-49 Tanzania   
   1949-51 Uganda   
   1948-51 Zambia   
   1948-50 Zimbabwe   
   1947-49 Angola   
   1948-50 Cameroon   
   1947-49 Mozambique  
   1947-49 Sierra Leone  
   1947-49 Congo DM  
   1950-52 Liberia   
1945-51 
1945-51 
Burundi 
Rwanda 
      1950 Guinea-Bissau     
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